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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
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 Nizar Al-Sharif applied for United States citizenship, 
but his application was denied because he had been convicted 
of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined to 
be an aggravated felony.  Al-Sharif contested the denial in the 
District Court, which entered summary judgment in favor of 
USCIS.  In this appeal, Al-Sharif argues that he is entitled to 
citizenship because, under our decision in Nugent v. Ashcroft, 
367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004), his conviction was not for an 
aggravated felony.  After oral argument before a panel of this 
Court, we elected sua sponte to hear the case en banc in order 
to determine whether Nugent remains good law.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we hold that it does not, and will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
 Al-Sharif is a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States.  In 1992, he and others arranged to connect callers in 
Israel to callers in countries with no direct phone service to 
Israel, for a fee, by routing the calls through an apartment in 
New Jersey.  Al-Sharif rented the apartment and set up phone 
service there using a false name and Social Security number.  
Afterwards, he abandoned the apartment without leaving a 
forwarding address or paying the phone bill. 
 As a result of this scheme, Al-Sharif pleaded guilty in 
1993 to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, with a stipulation that his fraud caused a loss to 
the victim of between $120,000 and $200,000.  He was 
sentenced to six months’ home confinement and five years’ 
probation, and was ordered to pay $128,838 in restitution to 
the phone company. 
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 In 2004, Al-Sharif applied to become a naturalized 
citizen of the United States.  On his application, he truthfully 
disclosed his conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
1
  
As a result, his application was denied by USCIS.  In the 
view of USCIS, Al-Sharif’s conviction was for an 
“aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 
which precluded him, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8), from 
demonstrating “good moral character,” as required for 
naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).  Al-Sharif sought 
review in the District Court, arguing that his conviction was 
not an “aggravated felony” for naturalization purposes.  The 
District Court disagreed, and granted summary judgment to 
USCIS.  Al-Sharif filed this timely appeal. 
II
2
 
A 
 Section 1101(a)(43) of Title 8 lists several categories 
of offenses that are considered “aggravated felon[ies]” for 
immigration purposes.  In particular, § 1101(a)(43)(G) makes 
any “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or 
burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at 
                                                 
1
 In 2006, the Government charged Al-Sharif with 
deportability as a result of his conviction; however, an 
immigration judge granted Al-Sharif a waiver of deportation. 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1421(c).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo.  
Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 
257 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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least one year” an aggravated felony, and § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) 
makes any “offense” that “involves fraud or deceit in which 
the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000” an 
aggravated felony.
3
  Although some of these categories of 
aggravated felonies can overlap, each category is separate 
from the others, and a particular conviction may constitute an 
aggravated felony under multiple sections of § 1101(a)(43).  
See Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2006) 
                                                 
3
 We note that Al-Sharif was convicted of conspiracy, 
which is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U).  However, because § 1101(a)(43)(U) only 
applies to “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense 
described in this paragraph,” we must review the underlying 
substantive offense to determine whether it is “an offense 
described in this paragraph.”  See In re S-I-K-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 324, 326 (BIA 2007) (requiring the government to prove 
that “at least one of the unlawful acts that was the object of 
the conspiracy was an offense” described in another 
paragraph of § 1101(a)(43)); see also Nijhawan v. Att’y Gen., 
523 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 2008) (looking to the underlying 
object of the conspiracy to determine if the alien committed 
an aggravated felony).  Because the language of the statute 
and In re S-I-K- require an examination of the elements of the 
substantive offense when analyzing whether a conspiracy is 
an aggravated felony, USCIS correctly based its denial of Al-
Sharif’s naturalization application on § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 
which deals with fraud.  This approach is in accord with that 
of many of our sister circuits.  See, e.g., Conteh v. Gonzales, 
461 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2006); Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 
F.3d 144, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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(explaining that forgery can be an aggravated felony under 
both § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and § 1101(a)(43)(R)). 
 In his plea agreement, Al-Sharif stipulated that his 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud caused a loss of more than 
$10,000.  Nevertheless, he argues that Nugent dictates that he 
is not an aggravated felon because his offense was a hybrid 
theft/fraud offense and he was not sentenced to at least one 
year in prison. 
 In Nugent, an alien was convicted in Pennsylvania 
state court of theft by deception in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3922 for passing a bad check worth $4,831, and was 
sentenced to a period of six to twenty-three months’ 
imprisonment.  367 F.3d at 163, 169.  We found that the 
alien’s offense was both a “theft offense” as defined in 
§ 1101(a)(43)(G), id. at 174, and an offense “involving fraud 
or deceit” as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), id. at 177.  As a 
result, we held that “to qualify as an aggravated felony under 
the INA [the alien’s offense] must meet the requirements of 
Section 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), loss to the victim of more than 
$10,000, in addition to Section 1101(a)(43)(G), term of 
imprisonment of at least one year.”  Id. at 174–75 (emphasis 
added).  This theory—that an alien convicted of an offense 
that is both a “theft offense” and an offense “involv[ing] 
fraud or deceit” is an aggravated felon only if he satisfies both 
the loss threshold of § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) and the 
imprisonment threshold of § 1101(a)(43)(G)—has since 
become known as the “hybrid offense” theory.  See Bobb, 458 
F.3d at 215. 
 In the nine years since this Court adopted the hybrid 
offense theory in Nugent, we have never found another hybrid 
offense.  See Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. 436, 
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439 n.4 (BIA 2008).
4
  Rather, in Bobb, we declined to find 
that an offense that was both “relat[ed] to . . . forgery,” as 
defined in § 1101(a)(43)(R), and “involve[d] fraud or deceit,” 
as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), was a hybrid offense.  458 
F.3d at 226.  In doing so, we explicitly limited Nugent to 
“classificational schemes in which one classification is 
entirely a subset of another.”  Id.  The hybrid offense theory, 
Bobb explained, could not apply to “separate universal 
classifications which intersect, but which have separate and 
independent elements.”  Id.   
 While our holding in Bobb reaffirmed the basic 
premise of the hybrid offense theory, it raised a serious 
question about the theory’s scope.  When read literally, 
Bobb’s statement that the hybrid offense theory is “restricted 
to classificational schemes in which one classification is 
entirely a subset of another” seems to suggest that the hybrid 
offense theory would not even apply to § 1101(a)(43)(G) and 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) because the classification “theft offense” 
is not entirely a subset of “an offense . . . involv[ing] fraud or 
deceit.”  This conclusion, and the rule that “no subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a 
previous panel,” Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc., 651 F.3d 357, 
                                                 
4
 Other than Bobb, the only cases from our Circuit that 
discuss Nugent’s hybrid offense theory are a handful of not 
precedential opinions.  See Familia v. Att’y Gen., 507 F. 
App’x 234, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2012); Minaya v. Att’y Gen., 453 
F. App’x 168, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2011); Hatkewicz v. Att’y 
Gen., 350 F. App’x 667, 671 (3d Cir. 2009); Mirat v. Att’y 
Gen., 184 F. App’x 153, 155–56 (3d Cir. 2006).  Each refused 
to extend the hybrid offense theory to the relevant statute of 
conviction. 
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363–64 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1), raised the 
question of what, exactly, remained of Nugent following 
Bobb. 
 Following Bobb, our Court has struggled with the 
applicability of the hybrid offense theory to fraud conspiracy 
cases, such as this one.  Two panels of our Court issued not 
precedential opinions finding that fraud conspiracies were not 
hybrid offenses by analyzing the elements of the conspiracies, 
rather than the substantive fraud offenses.  See Familia v. 
Att’y Gen., 507 F. App’x 234, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2012); Minaya 
v. Att’y Gen., 453 F. App’x 168, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 In addition, no other court of appeals has adopted 
Nugent’s hybrid offense theory.  Only a handful of published 
opinions from our sister Circuits have dealt with the hybrid 
offense theory.  See, e.g., Magasouba v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 
13, 15 (1st Cir. 2008); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 
539 (5th Cir. 2008); Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 280 
(4th Cir. 2005).  These Circuits have all avoided applying the 
theory by disposing of the cases on other grounds.  See 
Magasouba, 543 F.3d at 15 (“Nugent has been restricted to 
classificational schemes in which one classification is entirely 
a subset of another.  As previously mentioned, that is not the 
case here.”  (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Martinez, 519 F.3d at 539 (“Our court has not decided 
whether an offense may properly be characterized as a hybrid 
fraud/theft offense, which must meet the requirements of both 
subsections (G) and (M)(i).”); Soliman, 419 F.3d at 280 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (“Because we are able to resolve Soliman’s 
petition for review by finding that Soliman’s conviction was 
not for a theft offense under Subsection (G), we need not 
reach and address her alternative contention with respect to 
imputing Subsection (M)(i)’s minimum threshold requirement 
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to Subsection (G).”).  For its part, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) has declined to follow the hybrid offense 
theory.  See Garcia-Madruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 440 n.5 
(“That [theft and fraud may be coextensive] does not mean, 
however, that we subscribe to the Nugent court’s holding that 
in such an instance the elements of both aggravated felony 
branches must be demonstrated.” (emphasis in original)). 
 The Supreme Court too has recently issued an opinion 
casting further doubt upon the hybrid offense theory.  In 
Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012), the Court 
stated that: “The language of [§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)] is clear.  
Anyone who is convicted of an offense that ‘involves fraud or 
deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000’ has committed an aggravated felony.”  Id. at 1173 
(emphasis added).  Read literally, this statement conflicts 
with Nugent, as the hybrid offense theory leaves open the 
possibility that someone convicted of an offense “involv[ing] 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 
exceeds $10,000” has not committed an aggravated felony.  
This is exactly what Al-Sharif argues here: that, although his 
offense falls within the definition of § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), it is 
not an aggravated felony because it is also a “theft offense” 
that did not result in at least one year of imprisonment. 
 Mindful of this history, we now overrule Nugent’s 
hybrid offense theory because it has been rejected by other 
courts and conflicts with the plain language of the statute. 
B 
 We do not overturn our precedents lightly.  
“[P]recedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of 
reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course 
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that is sure error.”  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 
(2010).  However, stare decisis “is not an inexorable 
command.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).  
“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable,” they may be 
overturned.  Id. at 827.  This is particularly true “if the 
precedent is particularly recent and has not generated any 
serious reliance interests,” Morrow v. Balaski, --- F.3d ----, 
2013 WL 2466892, at *16 (3d Cir. Jun. 14, 2013) (en banc) 
(Smith, J., concurring), or if the precedent has “sustained 
serious erosion from our recent decisions,” Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
 Here, the hybrid offense theory “has not generated any 
serious reliance interests.”  In the nine years since we have 
adopted it, it has been applied by no Court of Appeals, 
including our own.  Rather, it has “sustained serious erosion 
from . . . recent decisions.”  We have greatly limited its 
applicability, see Bobb, 458 F.3d at 226, the BIA has declined 
to follow it, see Garcia-Madruga, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 440 n.5, 
and the Supreme Court’s dicta in Kawashima has cast 
substantial doubt upon it.  See IFC Interconsult, AG v. 
Safeguard Int’l Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 311 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“[W]e pay due homage to the Supreme Court’s well-
considered dicta as [lighthouses] that guide our rulings.”). 
 On its merits, the hybrid offense theory cannot easily 
be reconciled with the text of the statute.  “[W]hen [a] 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at 
least where the disposition required by the text is not 
absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”  Sebelius v. 
Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2013).  The language of 
§ 1101(a)(43) is plain.  Each of its subparagraphs lays out a 
separate aggravated felony and there is no indication in the 
statute that an offense must satisfy multiple subparagraphs in 
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order to be an aggravated felony.  Thus, an offense that 
“involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim 
exceeds $10,000” is an aggravated felony under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) regardless of whether it also meets the 
requirements of some other subparagraph.  As the Supreme 
Court recently emphasized in Kawashima: “The language of 
[§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)] is clear.  Anyone who is convicted of an 
offense that ‘involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the 
victim or victims exceeds $10,000’ has committed an 
aggravated felony . . . .”  132 S. Ct. at 1173 (emphasis added).  
The hybrid offense theory conflicts with the Supreme Court’s 
textual interpretation insofar as it implies that at least some 
fraud offenses with losses exceeding $10,000—namely, those 
that are also theft offenses and for which the offender was not 
sentenced to at least a year of imprisonment—are not 
aggravated felonies.
5
  Therefore, we now overrule that theory. 
 Having held that Nugent is no longer the law of this 
Circuit, we hold that Al-Sharif was properly deemed an 
aggravated felon under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  Wire fraud is 
clearly an offense “involv[ing] fraud or deceit,” see Doe v. 
Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 266, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2011), and Al-
Sharif’s plea agreement stipulated that he caused a loss of 
between $120,000 and $200,000—well in excess of the 
$10,000 threshold for a fraud to be considered an aggravated 
felony.  Thus, Al-Sharif’s offense was an aggravated felony 
                                                 
5
 We also note that, under the hybrid offense theory, a 
defendant who is convicted of an offense that is both theft and 
fraud receives more favorable treatment than a defendant who 
is convicted of either theft or fraud alone.  This incongruity 
reinforces further our holding that the hybrid offense theory is 
inconsistent with the statute. 
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and the District Court properly entered summary judgment in 
favor of USCIS. 
III 
 Al-Sharif raises two additional arguments, but neither 
is persuasive.  First, he argues that the 1996 aggravated 
felony definitions, which reduced the loss threshold at which 
fraud becomes an aggravated felony, do not apply to him.  
We rejected a nearly identical argument in Biskupski v. 
Attorney General, 503 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2007), where we 
held that the 1996 aggravated felony definitions applied 
retroactively to crimes committed before 1996, so long as the 
“orders or decisions of the [immigration judge] or BIA which 
apply the ‘aggravated felony’ definitions” were issued after 
the 1996 amendments.  Id. at 283.  Here, USCIS denied Al-
Sharif’s naturalization application in 2009, long after the 
1996 amendments took effect.  Although USCIS and not an 
immigration judge or the BIA was making that determination, 
our reasoning in Biskupski still applies because, until USCIS 
issued a final decision, Al-Sharif “remain[ed] the subject of 
administrative adjudication and ha[d] not established any 
right to the benefit he [wa]s seeking to obtain by his 
application.”  Id. (internal quotation mark and alteration 
omitted). 
 Second, Al-Sharif argues that the rule of lenity, which 
requires courts to “constru[e] any lingering ambiguities in 
deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” see INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987), applies to him.  However, 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) is unambiguous.  Section 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i) is clear that an offense that “involves fraud 
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000” is an aggravated felony.  Therefore, Al-Sharif is not 
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entitled to relief under the rule of lenity.  See Kawashima, 132 
S. Ct. at 1175–76 (declining to apply rule of lenity because 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M) was “clear enough”); Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (rule of lenity only 
applies if there is a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
statute”). 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the hybrid 
offense theory of Nugent no longer remains good law and the 
District Court did not err when it held that Al-Sharif was not 
entitled to citizenship by virtue of his 1993 conviction for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
